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Abstract 
We examine the role of politico-economic influences on macroeconomic performance within 
the framework of an endogenous growth model with costly technology adoption and 
uncertainty. The model is aimed at understanding the diversity in growth and inequality 
experiences across countries. Agents adopt either of two risky technologies, one of which is 
only available through financial intermediaries, who are able to alleviate some of this risk. 
The entry cost of financial intermediation depends on the proportion of government revenue 
that is allocated towards cost-reducing financial development expenditure, and agents vote on 
this proportion. The results show that agents at the top and bottom ends of the distribution 
prefer alternative means of re-distribution, thereby effectively blocking the allocation of 
resources towards cost-reducing financial development expenditure. Thus political factors 
have a role in delaying financial and capital deepening and economic development. 
Furthermore, the model provides a political-economy perspective on the Kuznets curve; 
uncertainty interacts with the political economy mechanism to produce transitional inequality 
patterns that, depending on initial conditions, can unearth the Kuznets-curve experience. 
Finally, the political outcomes are inefficient relative to policies aimed at maximizing the 
collective welfare of agents in the economy. 
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1. Introduction 
The idea that barriers to development can arise because of politico-economic factors is the 
subject of a growing volume of literature.  This study contributes to that literature by 
exploring the interplay between risk associated with technology adoption and politico-
economic influences. In doing so, the theory developed in this paper aims to understand the 
diversity in growth and inequality experiences across countries. It also provides a politico-
economic perspective on recent observations relating to the patterns of inequality in some 
developed and emerging nations, and recent empirical findings on the relationship between 
growth and inequality.  
In relation to patterns of inequality, this paper brings into focus an empirical literature on 
the Kuznets curve – the inverted U shaped pattern of inequality unearthed in a seminal 
contribution by Kuznets (1955), who used data from industrialized nations to show that 
inequality increases in the early stages of development, becomes constant for a while and 
then falls when an economy has reached a certain level of development. Subsequent literature 
that examines the impact of economic growth on inequality provides mixed evidence on the 
Kuznets hypothesis. See for example Paukert (1973), Adelman and Morris (1973), Chenery et 
al. (1974), Bacha (1979), Ahluwalia, Carter and Chenery (1979), and Adelman and Robinson 
(1989), Barro (2000) for evidence in support of the, and Papanek and Kyn (1986), 
Bourguignon and Morrison (1990), Li, Squire and Zou (1998) for evidence that questions this 
hypothesis.1 In relation to transitional economies, the experience of some Latin-American 
economies, such as Columbia and Brazil seems consistent with this hypothesis, while that of 
Asian economies, such as South Korea, Taiwan and Japan seems inconsistent with it 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002). The model of this paper seeks a politico-economic 
explanation for this mixed nature of empirical experience. Specifically, it shows that, 
depending on initial conditions, a variety of patterns for the evolution of inequality are 
possible, including the Kuznets curve. 
This study also supports the idea, recognized in both theoretical and empirical literature, 
that there is a two-way link between inequality and growth. (See for example Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2003). Our explanation for this link rests on the political influences that determine 
policies and institutions – initial inequality and the level of development determine 
redistributive policies through the political process, which in turn influences inequality and 
                                                          
1 Furthermore, Gottshalk and Smeeding (1997), Smeeding (2000) and Zollino (2004) observe that several 
developed nations from Europe and European Offshoots experienced increases in inequality between the early 
1980s and the early 1990s, following decreases in the 1950s. 
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growth in the future. There are, however, other explanations in the literature, which also have 
a bearing on the Kuznets hypothesis mentioned above. Banerjee and Newman (1993), Aghion 
and Bolton (1994) and Perotti (1993) develop endogenous growth models to show that the 
interaction between initial inequality and capital market imperfections could result in 
increases in growth and inequality in the early stages of development. These studies suggest 
different mechanisms through which this early  trend in inequality could reverse at a later 
stage of development, resulting in the inverted-U shaped relationship between growth and 
inequality. 
Another strand of literature that motivates this study relates to the relationship between 
institutions and economic development. Various studies provide conflicting arguments on 
this relationship. Some studies argue that causality runs from institutions to economic 
development (see Alesina, et al., 2001; Iversen and Soskice, 2003; La Porta, et al., 1998). 
Others argue that causality runs from economic development to institutions and in turn to 
economic outcomes (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006 and references therein). The latter 
studies recognise the idea that institutions are endogenous in the economy and they reflect 
continuous conflicts among agents or groups of agents over the choice of institutions and the 
distribution of resources. Consequently, the prevailing institutional design depends on the 
groups of agents that either constitutes the majority or those who have greater influence in the 
political process underlying the determination of institutional reforms.  
This study is concerned with the latter literature, and more specifically, about how initial 
inequality influences institutions and long-run economic outcomes. This issue remains a 
subject of disagreement in the extant literature. Galor et al. (2009) develop a model that 
shows that inequality in land ownership delays the development of human-capital enhancing 
institutions thereby slowing the structural transformation from an agricultural to an industrial 
economy. Other studies examine how the interaction between initial inequality and 
institutions in the presence of redistribution influences economic outcomes. For example, 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) develop models to show that 
redistribution through the political process has a negative impact on economic growth. In 
these models, agents vote for a tax rate on capital. In the presence of initial inequality, the 
median agent votes for a high capital tax rate. However, Li and Zou (1998) construct a model 
that show that under certain circumstances, high inequality could spur growth if public 
consumption is incorporated into consumer preferences. Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) and 
Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2013) explore how the interaction between inequality and politico-
economy issues influences technological innovation and/or technology adoption using 
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overlapping generations models. The former study shows that vested-interest groups 
comprising of the users of the old technology use their political influence to block the new 
technologies, while the latter shows that the poor agents, whose resource endowment is too 
low relative to the cost of adopting modern technologies block the allocation of resources 
towards R&D and capital deepening at the early stages of the development. This results in 
low pace of technological change and economic growth.  
Another issue that motivates this study stems from the literature discussed in the 
preceding paragraph, and it relates to redistribution of wealth through a political process. 
Given that empirical studies tend to find an inconclusive link between redistribution and 
economic development (see Zweimuller 2000), a question that arises is whether it is 
redistribution per se or the mechanism through which it is carried out that matters for long-
run macroeconomic performance. In particular, we are interested in whether collective 
decision making of the type that occurs through a political process which is intrinsically 
democratic in nature, may be inefficient. Although a substantial part of the political economy 
literature in macroeconomics is positive in scope (see for example Krusell and Rios-Rull 
1996) its results (such as the negative consequences of the political process for technology 
adoption) motivate normative issues (such as the appropriateness of the mechanism and what 
one can do about it). 
This debate has indirect empirical relevance for some economies. An example that 
commonly features in the comparative economics literature is that of China and India (see 
Wong, 1989; Nin-Pratt et al., 2008; 2010), two economies that that are well known for the 
large geographical sizes and large population, the majority of which has remained poor 
during most of the twentieth century. Since the late 1970s both nations embarked on rapid 
reforms that included accelerated industrialisation, international trade reforms, agricultural 
reforms, etc (Anderson, 2003). However, while China, a ‘command economy’ experienced a 
sevenfold increase in GDP and sustained growth in agricultural sector productivity, India, an 
‘open, participatory and multiparty democracy’ only experienced a twofold increase in GDP 
and quite disappointing increases in agricultural sector productivity (see Nin-Pratt et al., 
2010). China has also outperformed India with reference to other development indicators 
such as per capita GDP, life expectancy, child mortality, and human capital development as 
measured by adult literacy and tertiary enrolment rates.2 Some of the explanations that have 
been suggested for the performance of China over India include the additional institutional 
                                                          
2 The conclusion here is based on comparing the two nations using data from the World Bank (2012), World 
Development Indicators. 
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reforms in China that resulted in migration of labour from agriculture to other sectors of the 
economy (Hari, 2002). 
An argument that has been made by some political analysts and academics, then, is that 
given its ‘command economic system’, China might have managed to implement the above-
mentioned growth-oriented reforms relatively easily while India, a ‘multiparty democracy’ 
might have found it difficult to implement growth-oriented reforms due to opposition from 
lobbies and interest groups (see Huang, 2011). There are, however, a large number of studies, 
particularly is the literature on the link between democracy and growth which make the 
opposite assertion, i.e. democracy is good for growth. See, for example, Rodrik and Wacziarg 
(2005), and Fidrmuc (2003), among others. Overall, however, the debate in this literature 
remains an unsettled one; a positive link, even if it exists is not an unconditional one and 
depends on other circumstances, such as the type of democratic/authoritarian regime(as in 
Persson and Tabellini, 2006) and the timing of transition to a democracy or whether the 
country is rich or poor before the transition (Persson and Tabellini, 2006 and Shen 2002). 
Our approach to this issue is a theoretical one. Within the framework of our model, we 
compare the economic outcomes of redistribution through the political process with those that 
occur when the redistribution is carried out by a central planner with the aim of maximizing 
the aggregate welfare of agents in the economy. We emphasize that there are no clear-cut 
empirical counterparts to these cases; the political mechanism in the model represents a 
perfectly functioning democracy, while the central planning scenario corresponds perfectly 
functioning command economy with a benevolent social planner.  However, insofar as these 
cases may be considered indirectly representative of the ‘democracy v/s central planning’ 
approaches to economic transition, the ‘black box’ of the model suggests that collective 
choice of policy through the voting mechanism leads to outcomes that are inefficient relative 
to the social planning approach, in that economic transition is achieved faster under the social 
planner’s case, with lower levels on inequality on the transition path. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that both systems lead to eventual economic transition with positive growth 
rates on the transition path. Furthermore, the average growth rate experienced in the early 
stages of transition can be higher in the political economy. The model is therefore consistent 
with a positive correlation between democracy and growth suggested in some of the above 
mentioned studies. 
The model developed in this study explores how redistribution through a political process 
affects technology adoption and economic outcomes, and it assumes intergenerational 
transfer of wealth in the same sprit as studies of Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) and Lahiri and 
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Ratnasiri (2013). However, the model departs from those of the two studies in the sense that 
technology adoption decisions are taken in the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty and 
financial imperfections, as in an endogenous growth model of Aghion and Bolton (1997).3 
Unlike Aghion and Bolton (1997), however, our model includes political economy aspects. 
Also, our focus is not on the borrowing and lending roles of financial intermediaries, but on 
their risk-diversifying role.  
In our model, agents adopt a high risk-high return technology, either directly or indirectly 
through financial intermediaries that can reduce the risk through pooling the idiosyncratic 
risks of agents. However, the use of the financial system is subject to payment of fixed entry 
fees and a periodic variable cost associated with financial intermediation.  
We introduce political economy issues by assuming the existence of a government that 
collects tax and then allow agents to vote on how the tax revenue should be redistributed. 
Two competing means of redistribution are on the menu of choice. One alternative is a lump-
sum transfer to every agent. The other is cost-reducing R&D and financial development 
expenditure. Information about the type of shock (i.e. good or bad) that agents will 
experience is not available prior to the voting process.  
The results suggest that in the presence of uncertainty and financial imperfections, there is 
a critical level of endowment that agents would require to access the financial system. This 
critical endowment is decreasing in the proportion of tax revenue that is allocated towards 
cost-reducing financial development expenditure. Because agents are risk averse, they would 
prefer to use financial intermediaries to diversify shocks. However, the main beneficiaries of 
cost reducing financial development expenditure are agents at the middle of the distribution, 
whose wealth is either just below or just above the aforementioned critical level. The former 
agents benefit because a reduction in the critical level of wealth gives them potential to 
access financial system if they face a good shock. The latter group is mainly motivated by the 
need to ensure that they will still access the financial system if they face a bad shock. Agents 
at the bottom-end of the distribution do not benefit as they are too far below the critical 
                                                          
3Uncertainty can delay technology adoption and economic development, particularly in developing nations 
where poor agents lack access to financial intermediaries, and rely on informal risk sharing agreement. The 
various channels through which this happens are outlined in studies such as Chinzara and Lahiri (2013), Dercon 
(2002) and Townsend (1995). Chinzara and Lahiri (2013) demonstrate, both theoretically and empirically, how 
uncertainty affects technology adoption and economic development. In fact, the model we develop in this study 
can be seen as a political economy extension to the stochastic technology adoption model of Chinzara and Lahiri 
(2013).   
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wealth necessary for entry, while agents at the top-end are too far above this critical level to 
worry bad shocks affecting their ability to access the financial system.  
The political outcome is therefore characterised by agents at the middle of the distribution 
voting for allocation through cost-reducing financial development expenditure, and agents 
both ends of the distribution blocking such expenditure. This “ends against the middle” 
feature of our model is also observed in other political economy models, for example, the 
model of Epple and Romano’s (1996).4  
Numerical simulations point to the existence of a number interesting dynamics in the 
political choices, and the resulting economic outcomes. In the transition to the steady state, 
political outcomes are characterised by periodic cycles. These cycles are, in part, due to the 
conflicting choices faced by ‘the ends’ and ‘the middle’, and the fact that the impact of these 
choices on current redistribution will have a reverse effect on future choices. More 
specifically, starting from certain initial level of inequality, if agents vote for redistribution, 
inequality suddenly falls. However, this sudden fall in inequality reduces the appetite for 
redistribution in the subsequent period, and thus inducing agents to vote against 
redistribution, resulting in an increase in inequality. The political cycles are then exacerbated 
by the fact that the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty causes precautionary voting among 
agents at the middle of the distribution.  
Inequality exhibits dynamic patterns of recurring Kuznets-like curves. These patterns are 
due to the aforementioned political cycles, and they can help to explain why some developed 
nations experience increases in inequality as outlined earlier (see Gottshalk and Smeeding, 
1997; Smeeding, 2000; Zollino, 2004). The explanation is that the decrease in inequality in 
these countries during the 1950s might have reduced the appetite for redistribution, resulting 
in rejection of redistribution/welfare oriented policies before the 1980s. Economic growth is 
sluggish and subject to fluctuations along its transitional path. The relationship between 
growth and inequality exhibit non-monotonic and bidirectional features, and its signs seems 
to switch from positive to negative to zero any point along the transitional path, depending on 
initial inequality and institutional parameters. The model thus provides a perspective on why 
the empirical literature on the link between inequality and growth remains inconclusive. 
Depending on initial conditions, a large variety of outcomes are possible. Furthermore, 
empirical studies are typically based on time-spans that are inadequate to address this issue, 
                                                          
4 The outcome is also somewhat contrary to the “Director’s Law”, discussed, for example in Stigler (1970), 
which states that public expenditures are made primarily to benefit the middle classes. 
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and do not account for the non-monotonic and bi-directional link between inequality and 
growth.5 
Further numerical experiments show that the political cycles, and the resulting 
sluggishness and fluctuations in growth and inequality are more pronounced when low initial 
inequality interacts with large standard error shocks. This implies that there may be a greater 
potential for group conflicts in societies with moderate rather than high levels of inequality. 
This could be due to the fact that in highly unequal societies are often characterized by 
distributions with two main interest groups, the poor who favour redistribution and the rich 
who are against it. However, in a society with moderate inequality, additional classes with 
diverse interests may emerge. These additional groups may include, for example, an 
emerging middle class, a maturing middle class, an emerging rich class, etc. Furthermore, the 
presence of precautionary voters resulting from uncertainty may increase the number of 
conflicting groups, thus exacerbating the fluctuations.  
Numerical simulations also suggest that the political economy choices are sub-optimal in 
the early and transitional stages of economy. This is because they do not coincide with 
choices that maximize the aggregate welfare of all agents. More specifically, the political 
process is biased towards the rejection of policies aimed at financial and capital deepening. 
This results in low pace of technology adoption, economic growth and wealth redistribution. 
However, once the economy reaches the steady state path, the two policy choices are similar. 
Our model is also able to explain the diverse growth and inequality patterns observed 
across different nations. Such diversity has been highlighted, for example, in the work of 
Pritchet (1997). According to our model, factors such as the quality of initial institutions, the 
level of initial inequality, and the mechanisms through which wealth redistribution takes 
place play important roles in explaining these diverse economic outcomes.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the 
economic environment and carry out some comparative static analysis with the political 
economy model. To shed light on the dynamics, in Section 4.3, we conduct some numerical 
experiments. We then compare the political outcomes to the welfare maximizing outcomes. 
In Section 4.4, we conclude the paper. The appendix presents some technical details of the 
analysis in Section 4.2. 
 
                                                          
5 See Banerji and Duflo (2003) for an elaborate critique of these approaches, also based on a politico-economic 
perspective on inequality and growth. 
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4.2 The Economic Environment 
We consider a two-period overlapping-generations economy with N-agents whose wealth 
holdings are heterogeneous. A new generation is born every period. Each ith agent is born 
with a unit of unskilled labour endowment that can earn them a subsistence wage w . Agents 
born in period t also inherit wealth from their parents in the form of bequests. Time is 
discrete, with t = 0, 1, 2,...., and initial distribution of wealth is described by W ( . ).   
The economy has two technologies, one subject to high risk (hereafter referred to as 
Technology B) and another, that is only accessed through financial intermediaries, who are 
able to minimize the risk by pooling risks of all agents (henceforth Technology F). The total 
return on Technology B has two components and is given by tit ,εηϑ += , where 0>η  is a 
time-invariant and non-stochastic component and ti,ε is a time-variant shock that is agent-
idiosyncratic. If the agent faces a bad shock, and this occurs with the probability p, then 
0,, <= liti εε , while if the agent faces a good shock 0,, >= hiti εε . We assume that 0][ , =tiE ε  and 
ηε <li, . The return on Technology F is similar to that of Technology B when the agent faces 
a good shock i.e. hit ,εηϑ += . However, when the agent faces a bad shock, the return on 
Technology F is φ where ηφεη <<+ li, . This modelling approach follows an idea by 
Townsend and Ueda (2006, 2010).  
As in Townsend and Ueda (2006, 2010), agents who decide to use financial 
intermediaries will deposit all their wealth in financial intermediaries. However, we assume 
that agents cannot borrow to adopt a certain technology. Rather, financial intermediaries 
invest on behalf of all the agents who deposit funds with them and offer the returns as 
described above, depending on the type of shock that an agent faces. Financial intermediaries 
charge two intrinsic and non-refundable costs. Firstly, they charge a once-off fixed entry fee 
0>ψ . This fee implicitly represents the registration and other fees that financial 
intermediaries incur including any mark-up they charge on customers. Secondly they charge 
a periodic service fee ]1,0[∈λ , which is a constant proportion of the returns on Technology F. 
Thus if agent i uses financial intermediaries, his/her return at any time t is given by
),(max)1()( φϑλϑ ttR −= .  
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There is also a government in the economy. The government supervises the financial 
intermediaries.6 The government raises its revenue by levying a constant tax rate of τ is 
levied on the heterogeneous agents’ total endowment. The distribution of the agents’ total 
endowment is described by a density function )(.)(Wf with support ),0( κ . The total revenue 
that the government raises in any period is described by: 
[ ] )1(
0
(.))(.)((.) tWdWWfWtGR τ
κ
τ =










= ∫  
where ( ).W  is as defined earlier and GRt is the revenue raised in period t. The government 
then uses a proportion tt Wg τα=  of the funds to reduce the cost associated with registering a 
financial intermediary and to fund its regulatory activities. The latter cost may, for example, 
include things such as the cost of training a financial regulator, engaging in research and 
other activities aimed at improving the financial system. Thus ψ  is decreasing in gt which in 
turn depends on α. The remainder of the revenue tt Wtr τα )1( −=  is given to all the young 
agents in the form of a lump-sum transfer.  
In this model, we consider the following properties for the functional forms of ψ 7 
(i) .0)('';0)(' ≥< gg ψψ  
(ii) 0)( =
∞→g
gψ  
The fixed cost is specified as follows: 







+
=
)1(
)(
tg
tg
ψ
ψ , where ψψ =)0( .  
We assume that the tax rate τ  is exogenously determined by the government. However, 
the agents vote on the proportion α  that should be allocated towards cost-reducing financial 
development expenditure. Voting takes place at the ‘first stage’ of each period t and the 
political outcome is determined by majority rule.  Prior to voting, agents do not know the sign 
or size of shock that they will face. In the “second stage” of period t, after considering the 
political outcome, agents decide whether they should use financial intermediaries or not. The 
timing of events is as characterised by the figure below: 
 
 
                                                          
6 We assume that there are extortionist elements in the financial system that would charge exorbitant fees 
without appropriate supervision. Note that we do not explicitly model financial regulation. 
7 We also explored the case where 𝜆 is endogenous. However, the results for this case were too obvious. As 
would be expected, both analytical and numerical result showed that the agents who adopt Technology F would 
favour the highest possible gt to be allocated towards the reducing 𝜆 while the agents who adopt Technology B 
prefer the highest possible trt. We provide a formal explanation in Appendix 3. 
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The economy produces output (Y) using capital (K). The production functions G(K) 
assume a simple “AK” specification, which suggests that capital is a composite good 
consisting of both human and physical capital. Specifically, the production functions for 
Technology F is G(Kt) = BKt and for Technology B is G(Kt) = FKt, where B and F denote 
the respective total factor productivity parameters associated with the two technologies, and 
B < F. 
The agent does not consume in the first period of his life. The utilities of the agents use 
and those who do not use financial intermediaries are as described in equations (2) and (3), 
respectively: 
)2()ln()1()ln()ln()1()ln(),,,( ,1
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1
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1
,
1
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1
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1
hB
it
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In equations (2) and (3), 1+itc  and 1+itb  denote period 2 household consumption and 
bequests for the ith agent. Superscripts B and F simply imply that the agent adopts 
Technology B and Technology F, respectively, while superscripts l and h denote that the 
agent faces a bad shock and a good shock, respectively. The parameter 𝜃 describes the extent 
of imperfect intergenerational altruism in the model.  
Every period each generation faces a problem regarding whether to use financial 
intermediaries or not. This decision depends on an agent’s resource endowment and this 
depends upon the resources they inherited from their parents through bequests.  
Agents face different budget constraints depending on whether they use the financial 
intermediaries or not. The budget constraints for agents that do not use the financial 
intermediaries are as follows:  
)4()1())(()1( ,1,
,
1 t
lB
ititli
lB
it WbWwc ταεητ −+−++−= ++  
 Old agents carry out 
state-contingent plans.   Voting 
outcome is 
revealed 
 Agents decide whether to seek 
financial intermediation, and 
make state-contingent plans 
 
t+1 t 
The shock that 
economy faces is 
revealed. 
  
Stage 2: Agents 
receive lump sum 
transfers  
  
Stage 1: Young agents 
vote on their desired 
level of α 
Next generation of 
young agents votes on 
the desired level of α 
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The resource endowments for agents depend on whether their parents used financial 
intermediaries or not, in addition to the idiosyncratic shocks faced by their parents. The 
resource endowment for agents whose parents did not use financial intermediaries is given by 
xB
itb
xB
itWitW
,, ==  while the endowment of agents whose parents used financial intermediaries 
is given by xFitb
xF
itWitW
,, == , where x = h, l.  
For agents who use financial intermediaries, the budget constraints are described as 
follows:  
)6()()1())(1()1( ,1
,
1 tt
lF
itit
lF
it gWbWwc ψταλφτ −−+−+−−= ++  
)7()()1())(()1()1( ,1,
,
1 tt
hF
itithi
hF
it gWbWwc ψταεηλτ −−+−++−−= ++  
Agent i’s problem is make choices of 1,1 ++ itbitc  that maximise his/her utility. More 
specifically, agents that do not seek financial intermediation maximise equation (2) subject to 
constraints (4) and (5). This yields the following optimal state-contingent consumptions and 
bequest plans:  
[ ] )8()1()()()1(
1
1
,
,
1 titli
lB
it WWwc ταεητθ
−+++−
+
=+  
[ ] )9()1()()()1(
1
1
,
,
1 tithi
hB
it WWwc ταεητθ
−+++−
+
=+  
[ ] )10()1()()()1(
1 ,
,
1 titli
lB
it WWwb ταεητθ
θ
−+++−
+
=+  
[ ] )11()1()()()1(
1 ,
,
1 tithi
hB
it WWwb ταεητθ
θ
−+++−
+
=+  
Alternatively, agents who use financial intermediaries maximise equation (3) subject to 
constraints (6) and (7). This yields the following optimal state-contingent consumption and 
bequest plans.    
[ ] )12()()1())(1()1(
1
1,
1 ttit
lF
it gWWwc ψταλφτθ
−−++−−
+
=+  
[ ] )13()()1())(()1()1(
1
1
,
,
1 ttithi
hF
it gWWwc ψταεηλτθ
−−+++−−
+
=+  
[ ] )14()()1())(1()1(
1
,
1 ttit
lF
it gWWwb ψταλφτθ
θ
−−++−−
+
=+  
[ ] )15()()1()))()(1()1(
1 ,
,
1 ttithi
hF
it gWWwb ψταεηλτθ
θ
−−+++−−
+
=+  
The ith agent will seek the financial intermediation iff 
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where )( *FU and )( *BU  represent the indirect utility functions for the agents who use 
financial intermediaries and agents who do not use financial intermediaries respectively and 
the subscript * denotes the optimal choice of the variable in question. It can then be shown 
that (16) implies the following (See proof in Appendix 1): 
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In equation (17), the first expression (henceforth LHS) gives the expected wealth of an 
agent who uses financial intermediaries and the second expression (hereafter RHS) gives the 
ratio of the expected wealth of an agent who does not use financial intermediaries.  
We define W* as the Wit that solves equation (17).8 This W * would represent the 
threshold level of initial endowment that is required for an agent to enter the financial 
intermediary system.  
   It is possible to gain some insight on how people vote by analysing the total change of 
W* with respect to changes in α. The results of the comparative static analysis presented in 
Appendix 2 show that W* is decreasing in α.9 This then suggests that agents are likely to 
prefer a high α in order to enter the financial intermediary system quickly. However, this 
decision is not clear-cut because agents also receive a lump-sum transfer payment tWτα )1( − , 
which is decreasing in α . Thus agents will have to weigh the trade-off between the benefits 
from a reduction of W * (in the form of high expected returns from financial intermediaries) 
and the lump-sum transfer. This trade-off is likely to vary from agent to agent depending how 
close they are W *.  
Therefore, it is important to analyse how the indirect utilities of individual agents change 
as α changes. More specifically, we compute the partial derivatives of the indirect utility 
functions of each agent i with respect to the parameter α i.e. ),(', ταtiV . Although it would be 
intuitive to argue that the rich agents would favour α > 0 (and poor people α = 0) to benefit 
from a reduction in entry costs, the political solution from this exercise is not conclusive 
because the sign of ),(', ταtiV  is neither clear nor constant across the range of values of α. 
                                                          
8 Intuition and numerical analysis suggest that this must be the case but it is difficult to provide formal proof. 
9 See the derivatives in Appendix 2. 
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Furthermore, the presence of uncertainty in the model introduces more complexity. This is 
because W* also shifts depending on the sign of εt. More specifically, if 0<lε , W 
* increases 
while if 0>hε , W 
* decreases.  
Based on this observation, it is intuitive to further subdivide the rich *WitW ≥ and the 
poor *WitW < in the four groups: (i) the poorest *WitW << who are at the lowest end of the 
distribution; (ii) the lower middle income *WitW < who are below but close W *; (iii) the 
upper middle income *WWit ≥  who are above but close to W 
*; (iv) the richest *WitW >> who 
are at the top end of the distribution.  
It is then possible to draw some intuition on how the four groups of agents vote on in 
the presence of uncertainty. Essentially, in the presence of uncertainty, the choice of α is now 
motivated by two more things. Firstly, a high α that reduces W * would be useful for agents 
just below W * (i.e. *WitW < ) especially when they expect that 0>= ht εε  because it could 
give them an opportunity to enter the financial system. However, agents *WWit <<  would not 
benefit as they are too far below W *. Secondly, a high α that reduces W * would be useful for 
agents just above W* (i.e. *WitW ≥ ) especially when they expect that 0<= lt εε  because it will 
protect them from the possibility of exiting the financial system. However, agents with 
*WWit >>  would not worry about exiting financial system because they are too far above W 
*. 
In summary, the presence of uncertainty is likely to result in involuntary collusion of poorest 
and richest agents ( *WWit << and *WWit >> ) in favour of α = 0 and involuntary collusion of 
agents *WitW <  and 
*WitW ≥  to vote α > 0. This collusion of agents at both ends of the 
distribution to oppose the choices of the agents at the middle of the distribution is partly 
consistent with Epple and Romano’s (1996) idea of the ‘ends against the middle’. In what 
follows we now carry out some numerical experiments to explore the intuition underlying the 
theoretical results of our model.  
 
4.3 Numerical Experiments and Discussion 
This section is divided into two main parts. In the first part, we analyse how the winning 
value of α  is determined through the political process. Subsequently, we analyse the 
implication of the political outcome for technology adoption decisions, and the evolution of 
growth and inequality over time. In the second part, we examine how the outcome of the 
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political process compares to an outcome that would result if the choice of α  was based on 
social welfare considerations.  
The initial distribution of wealth for the reported results is assumed to be lognormal with 
a mean of 2. 5 and standard error of 0.4 and there are 501 agents. The parameters used are 
reported in Table 4.1. The parameter choices are guided by the conditions set in the Section 
2. The numerical results presented are robust to sensitivity tests with different distributions 
and parameter values.  
 
4.3.1 The Political Outcome 
The results from the numerical experiments with the models are shown in Figure 4.1. In 
Figure 4.1, panel (a) shows the number of agents who use financial intermediaries versus 
those who do not. The winning values of α, and the proportion of agents voting for the 
winning value are shown in panels (b) and (c), respectively. Panels (d) and (e) show the 
implication of the political process on the transitional dynamics of inequality and average 
growth rate of all agents, respectively. Panel (f) separates the growth rate between the growth 
rate of the poor and that of the rich. 
These numerical results are quite consistent with the intuition set out in Section 2. As 
discussed in Section 2, the political outcomes of this model are determined by the battle 
between agents at both ends of the distribution (i.e. 
*WWit << and *WitW >> ), who prefer lump 
sum transfer payment versus agents from middle of the distribution (i.e. 
** WitWandWitW ≥< ), who prefer redistribution in the form of cost-reducing financial 
development expenditure. Because most agents are poor in the early stages of development, 
the political outcome is characterized by α = 0.10   
To elaborate on the reasons of the different choices made by different groups of agents 
above, agents at the bottom end of the distribution prefer a lump-sum transfer because a 
reduction in the cost of entering the financial intermediaries,  ψ  will not help them enter the 
financial system since their initial endowment is too far below W*. Agents at the top end of 
the distribution also prefer a lump sum transfer because cause a reduction in ψ  will not 
benefit them much given their endowment large enough; they will still afford to use financial 
intermediaries even in the event of a bad shock. On the other hand, the agents at the middle of 
                                                          
10 Note that at some points in the early stages of the economy, the political outcome is unclear because the 
proportion of agents voting for the winning is below 50%. 
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the distribution i.e. ** WitWandWitW ≥<  prefer redistribution through cost reducing 
expenditure for different reasons. For the former group this is because a reduction in entry 
cost will help them enter the financial system especially if there is a good shock. The latter 
group of agents (i.e. *WitW ≥ ) prefer α > 0 because of the desire to secure themselves from 
exiting the financial system in the event that they face a bad shock.  
As redistribution of wealth through taxation and lump sum transfers continues, agents’ 
wealth converges towards the middle of the distribution. As such the winning value of α, and 
the proportion of agents voting for this value sharply increases (see (b) and (c)). However, 
due to the reverse effects a decrease in equality cause by redistribution, and the precautionary 
voting caused by the presence of shocks, there is a tendency for the winning value of political 
outcome to fluctuate from time to time. We explore this feature of the model in the next sub-
section. Once all agents have entered the financial system the winning value of α decreases 
and converge at zero. Similarly, the number of agents in favour of the winning value 
converges to 100%. 
Inequality falls sharply in the transition to the steady, although it shows patterns of 
recurring ‘Kuznets’ and Kuznets-like curves. The decrease in inequality is due to the 
redistributive effects of taxation and transfer payments and is consistent with the idea that the 
downward segment of the Kuznets curve is driven by political reforms (see Lindert, 1994). 
As alluded to earlier, the fluctuations in inequality are a result of reserve causality between 
inequality and the political preference for redistribution. More specifically, a sharp decrease 
in current level of inequality reduces the preference towards redistributive policies in the next 
period.  
Panels (e) and (f) show the implication of the political process on growth. We separate the 
growth into three categories: the poor, representing 20% of the agents at the bottom end of 
the distribution, the rich, representing 20% of the agents at the top end of the distribution, and 
average, representing the average growth of all agents. During the early stages of the 
economy, the growth patterns vary across the different groups. Initially, the growth rate for 
richest agents is high but it gradually decreases, albeit non-monotonically. This highlights the 
fact that their tax payments outweigh the lump-sum transfer receipts. On the contrary, the 
growth rate of the poor agents start low and slightly increases implying that the lump-sum 
transfer receipts slightly outweigh their tax payments. The fluctuations in the growth rate of 
the poor agents are relatively marginal compared to those of the growth rate of the rich 
agents. The transitional path of the average growth rate seems to be driven by the growth rate 
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of the rich agents. Once the economy reaches its unique steady state, the growth rates of all 
agents in the economy converge.  
Average growth and inequality are positively related in the early stages of development, 
and positively related at some point along the transition to the steady state. Furthermore, at 
some points growth keeps increasing, when inequality has reached its steady state, suggesting 
that there is no relationship between these variable at these points. These results seem to 
suggest that growth and inequality are positively related in the short run, negatively related in 
the intermediate run and unrelated in the long run. Furthermore, the relationship between 
these variables is non-monotonic and bidirectional and non-linear. In summary these results 
highlight the complexity of the relationship between these variables and that empirical 
analyses of this relation should be subject to due caution. As argued earlier, the presence of 
these features in the growth-inequality relationship entail that empirical studies that impose 
linear and parametric relationship between growth and inequality are unlikely to 
appropriately capture the relationship between these two variables within a political 
economy.  
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Figure 4.1. The political outcome  
 
 
4.3.1.1 Political Cycles, Economic Fluctuations and Sluggishness: Role of shocks and Initial Inequality 
A unique feature of our political economy model is that the uncertainty inherent in the 
productivity parameters interacts with initial inequality in a manner that produces political 
cycles during the transitional stages of the economy. These political cycles result in periodic 
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fluctuations in inequality and growth, and a non-linear and bidirectional relationship between 
these variables. These political cycles also slow the pace at which the economy converges 
towards a balanced growth path.  
As alluded to earlier, there are two sources of these political cycles. Firstly, they emanate 
from the fact that there is a two-way link between inequality and the political preference for 
redistribution. Given initial heterogeneity in wealth, the majority of the agents will prefer 
redistribution in the next period resulting in a reduction in inequality. The resulting low 
inequality then entails that the agents’ preference for redistribution is reduced. Consequently, 
inequality increases in the subsequent period, which changes the political preference in the 
next period, and so on. The second source of political cycles is the fact that uncertainty 
causes precautionary voting by agents with wealth close to the threshold level. To elaborate 
on this point, in the presence of uncertainty, agents with *WitW ≥ face two competing 
choices. Firstly, they face the opportunity to further increase their wealth by voting for 
redistribution through lump-sum transfer receipts. Their wealth would especially increase if 
voting for a large transfer payment is then followed by a good shock in the next period. 
However, there is also a risk that voting for a transfer payment instead of cost-reducing 
financial development expenditure would leave them vulnerable to the possibility of exiting 
the financial system, especially if they were to face a bad shock in the next period. Thus, until 
their wealth becomes secure, these agents have a tendency to exercise ‘precautionary’ voting. 
This entails fluctuations in their preferred α depending on their previous experience and their 
expectations about future shocks. To explore the conditions under which these political 
cycles are more pronounced, we experiment with different levels of shocks and initial 
inequality. The results for the political outcomes and the economic implication of these 
political choices are presented in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, respectively. 
In Figure 4.2, panels (a) and (c) report the winning values of α, given initial inequality of 
0.33 and 0.11, respectively, and shocks of sizes ±1.25 and ±1. Panels (c) and (d) report the 
corresponding proportions of agents voting for the winning values of α under each of two 
circumstances. Generally, the results show that the political cycles are more pronounced 
under the combination of large standard error shocks and low initial inequality. As 
highlighted in Section 1, this result is explained by the fact that the presence of low initial can 
result in the emergence of many groups. As such redistributive policies are likely to be 
difficult to pass. On the other hand, high initial inequality usually entails the presence of a 
large group of many poor agents that push the redistribution agenda in a united front.   
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In Figure 2.3, we present the results on the economic implications of these political 
cycles. As with the case above, each of the graphs corresponds to the 0.11 and 0.33 level of 
inequality, and shocks of sizes ±1.25 and ±1. Panels (a) and (b) shows the member of agents 
accessing financial intermediaries, panels (c) and (d) shows the evolution of inequality, and 
panels (c) and (d) reports the evolution of growth. The results show that the excessive 
political cycles resulting by the interaction between low inequality and high standard error 
shocks induce significant fluctuations in growth and inequality. Furthermore, the political 
cycles delay and economic development. More specifically, growth and inequality take long 
to reach their steady states, the larger the political cycles. However, because shocks induce 
more precautionary voting and an early increase α, full entry into the financial system seems 
to happen slightly quicker when shocks are high..   
The fluctuations in inequality observed in our model are useful in explaining the 
inequality patterns of a number of developed nations. Such patterns in inequality are 
documented in studies such as Smeeding (2000), Brandolini (1999) Zollino (2004) who 
observe that UK, Sweden and USA, Japan, Denmark, Australia and New Zealand, and 
Netherlands, among others experienced a decrease in inequality in the 1950s, but an increase 
in inequality between the early the 80s to the early 90s. Furthermore, Ortiz and Cummins 
(2011) provide evidence that some among the countries (for example USA, New Zealand, Sweden) 
experienced further increase inequality between 1990 and 2000, followed by a decrease between 2000 
and 2008.   In line with Zollino (2004), our explanation is that these periodical and counter-
cyclical fluctuations inequality are endogenously determined by political economy conflicts.  
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Figure 4.2. Political Cycles: Role of initial inequality and shocks 
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Figure 4.3. Economic Fluctuations and Sluggishness: Role of initial inequality and shocks 
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4.3.3 The Political Outcome versus Social Welfare Maximization 
In this section we compare the political economy α with the α that would result if its 
choice was motivated by social welfare considerations. We define social welfare 
maximization in the utilitarian sense, i.e. the value of α that maximizes the sum of the utilities 
of all agents in the economy is the welfare maximizing outcome. The numerical results from 
this exercise are reported in Figure 4.4. Panel (a) reports the winning α and panel B reports 
the proportion voting for the winning α. The solid line shows the winning α from the political 
economy, while the broken lines shows the α that would result when choice was based on the 
maximum of the sum of welfare of all agents.  
It is interesting to note that policy choices differ between the political economy and the 
welfare maximization during the early and the transitional stages of the economy. At the 
early stages of development, the political process tends to produce a winning α that is 
significantly below the one that maximizes social welfare. The explanation for this is that at 
the early stages of the economy, most agents are poor and they prefer lump-sum transfer 
payments. As redistribution occurs through each successive generation, most agents move 
into the middle of the distribution. This then explains why the winning α from the political 
economy suddenly and sharply rises above the welfare maximizing α. As in the previous 
cases, the winning α’s fluctuates overtime until the economy reaches the steady state, at 
which time two α’s eventually converge. Panel (b) shows that the political economy is 
associated with significant delays in entries into the financial systems. This is mainly because 
policies aimed at cost-reducing financial development are rejected in the early stages of 
development.  
 
Figure 4.4. Political process versus welfare maximization  
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4. 3.3 Policy Choice: Political Outcome versus Social Welfare Maximization 
Thus far, an important revelation from the numerical experiments is that certain groups 
block development-oriented policies especially at the early stages of the economy. This 
implies that policies that maximize the overall welfare of the society may continue to face 
resistance. The question that arises, then, is whether an economy that is run with the 
objectives of maximizing overall welfare results in better growth and inequality outcomes 
compared to a political economy.  
To explore this issue, we compare the outcomes of the political economy case with that 
which would prevail if a social planner maximizes the collective welfare of all agents in the 
economy. Figure 4.5 compares the growth and inequality outcomes of a political economy to 
those of an economy that is run on social welfare considerations. Panel (a) compares the 
transitional dynamics of inequality, and panels (b), c and (d) compare the transitional 
behaviour of average growth, growth of the rich and growth of the poor agents, respectively, 
under the two policy choices. In all the panels, the solid line represents the political economy 
outcomes and the broken line represents the social welfare outcomes. 
It is evident that the transitional behaviour of both growth and inequality differ between 
the two ‘regimes’. Inequality falls much sharper and converges to the steady state quicker 
under the welfare-maximizing economy than the political economy. Under the political 
economy, inequality first increases, and then fluctuates at high levels before it falls and 
converges to its steady state path. These fluctuates are not evident in the welfare maximizing 
economy mainly because the welfare-maximizing choices are more likely to result in the 
pooling of idiosyncratic shocks. Similarly, fluctuations are also evidence in the growth rates 
under the political economy, while they are much smoother under the welfare maximizing 
economy. Panel (c) and panel (d) show that the rich agents tend to benefit at the expense of 
the poor under the political economy. This is because their political economy as is above the 
welfare maximising outcomes during some periods, while for the poor, welfare maximizing 
outcomes are always above political economy outcomes. However, the outcomes from the 
policy choices eventually converge once the economy reaches its steady state. 
Interestingly, however, it is possible for average growth rates in the transitional phases of 
the economy can be larger in the political equilibrium, as seen in panel (b) of Figure 4.5. The 
social welfare maximizing economy is, nevertherless, better at achieving the transition to 
“balanced growth” sooner relative to the political economy. Inequality, too, falls at a faster 
rate in the social planner’s economy, as seen in panel (a) of Figure 4.5. This is because, as 
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evidenced in the panel (d) of the same figure, the growth rate (on the transition path) of 
poorer agents is much higher in the social planner’s economy. 
  Figure 4.5. Political Process versus Central Planner under endogenous entry cost 
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their preferences by voting between two competing alternatives for distribution. The political 
outcome is based on the majority rule.  
The analytical and numerical results show that agents at both ends of the distribution 
blocks expenditures towards cost-reducing financial development. This delays the pace of 
technological advancement, financial and capital deepening, and economic development. 
However, as redistribution continues through generations, the middle of the distribution 
becomes successively thicker and the majority of the agents start supporting policies aimed at 
cost-reducing financial development expenditure.  
Our model shows a unique feature of political cycles. The cycles partly emanate from the 
two-way link between changes in inequality and redistribution, but are further exacerbated by 
the fact that the presence of shocks results in precautionary voting. These cycles induce 
‘Kuznets’-like patterns in transitional inequality, and fluctuations in growth. In their path to 
the steady state, growth and inequality exhibit a bidirectional and non-linear relationship, and 
the signs of this relationship vary through the stages of development. This highlights the need 
for caution when empirically assessing the growth-inequality relationship.  
The political cycles delay the pace at which the economy converges to its balanced 
growth path. Low initial inequality and large standard error shocks seem to exacerbate these 
political cycles, as well as their resulting impact on economic fluctuations, and delay in pace 
at which the economy convergences to the steady state. This highlights the idea that when 
inequality is low, many groups with conflicting interests emerge.   
Finally, the results show that the political outcomes do not coincide with the welfare 
maximising outcomes during the early and the transitional stages of the economy. This is in 
line with the idea that interest groups in the economy slow the pace of technological 
advancement (see Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1996). However, once there are more agents are in 
the middle of the distribution, the political process tends to produce outcomes that are 
supportive of development. The political economy outcomes converge to the welfare 
maximising outcomes when the economy has reached its steady state path.  
The findings of the study provide a number of useful implications for direction of future 
research. Firstly, one could explore whether a different tax structure, for example progressive 
taxing will yield different results. Secondly, alternative mechanisms of redistribution, for 
example investment in human capital development through expenditure on education, health, 
and other social services can be explored. Thirdly, pending the availability of adequate data 
on inequality, it will be interesting to empirically explore the political cycles, the unique 
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inequality patterns, as well as some interesting insights into the growth-inequality 
relationship produced by the model.  
 
Appendix 4.1: Proof of Inequality (17) 
Agents invest in project B iff indirect utility of project B is greater that indirect utility of project A. 
This implies that agents invest in project B  
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Substituting for the functional forms of the utility function we get, 
)ln()1()ln()ln()1()ln()ln()1()ln()ln()1()ln( ,1
,
1
,
1
,
1
,
1
,
1
,
1
,
1
hX
it
lX
it
hX
it
lX
it
hF
it
lF
it
hF
it
lF
it bpbpcpcpbpbpcpcp ++++++++ −++−+≥−++−+ θθθθ  
Recognising that 11 ++ = itit cb θ , we can substitute for 1+itb  and using the laws of logarithms and then 
simplifying, we can obtain the following:  
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Since log is a monotonic transformation, it must be that:  
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] )1()1( ,1,1,1,1
pppp
hX
it
lX
it
hF
it
lF
it CCCC
−−
++++ ⋅≥⋅  
Which we can alternatively express as follows:  
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Now rewriting hXit
lX
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hF
it
lF
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,
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,
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,
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,
1 ,,, ++++  in terms of their definitions in steady state equations (10), (11), 
(14), (15) and given that there exist a level of endowment W* that equates the LHS to the RHS, we 
can obtain equation (19).  
 
Appendix 4.2: Comparative Statics Analysis with α 
Assuming that W* exist, we can rewrite equation (19) in logarithmic form as follows: 
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Then taking the total derivative of W* with respect to α, simplifying and collecting like terms will 
yield the following will then yield the following for the LHS: 11  
 
                                                          
11 Notice that by using the steady state consumption functions in equations (10) to (19), it is possible to write 
each of the terms in brackets in equation (14) and (15) as: sFitC
sB
itC
,
1)1(,
,
1)1( ++++ θθ  where superscript s = h, l.   
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It is convenient to interpret the first fraction in the brackets as some weighted average consumption 
for an agent i who seek financial intermediation and the second term as some weighted average 
consumption for an agent i who do not seek financial intermediation after multiplying the 
consumption under each state with the net return on investment under that state. Since the model is 
such that the agents who use financial intermediaries are on average better off than agents who do not 
use financial intermediaries, it is easy to see that the above expression is greater than zero.  
 
For the RHS we obtain the following:  
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Here we can interpret first fraction in the brackets as some weighted average consumption for an 
agent i who seek financial intermediation and the second term as some weighted average consumption 
for an agent i who do not seek financial intermediation each multiplied by government revenue. Since, 
the first term is greater than the second term, the sign of the above expression is inferred from the 
third term. Since 0)(' <tgψ , the third expression is less than zero. Thus, 0
*
<
αd
dW
 
 
 
Appendix 4.3: Proof that agents will always vote α > 0 λ is endogenous in the political process 
We consider the changes in Indirect Utility Functions (IUF) with respect to α when λ is endogenous 
All agents *WWit < will adopt Technology X. Thus their preferences are characterised by equation 
(2).  
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Recognising that 11 ++ = itit cb θ , we can substitute for 1+itb  and using the laws of logarithms and then 
simplifying, we can obtain the following indirect utility function:  
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Now we can substitute for lXitc
,
1+  and 
hX
itc
,
1+  using their optimal consumptions equations (10) and (11) 
to obtain the following:  
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Now differentiating with respect to α and simplifying we can get the FOC for IUFx 
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All agents *WitW > will adopt Technology F. Thus their preferences are characterised by equation 
(3). By following the same steps as above, it is possible to derive the following FOC for IUFF with 
respect to α:  
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where tWtg ατ= . Since λ is decreasing in α, it is easy to see that the first term positive. Thus, 
0)( >
∂
∂
α
αFIUF
 
Therefore, if λ is endogenous and ψ is exogenous, the political economy is characterised by agents 
*WitW <  voting α = 0 and agents 
*WitW > voting α > 0.  
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